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Introduction
James Pendergast wanted to contest $20 worth of roaming fees that
Sprint had charged him, as these charges were incurred from calls in
his own home. 1 Pendergast filed a class action on behalf of Sprint
customers who had noticed the same issue only to learn, when his suit
was thrown out of a Miami court, that Sprint included an arbitration
clause in its form. 2 Pendergast was like many consumers who have no
idea they agreed to arbitrate all disputes, as well as waive a right to
join any actions, when entering into these types of “take it or leave it”
contracts. 3 In this situation, Pendergast’s lawyer advised him that
1.

Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere,
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywherestacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/CPZ8-6TFQ].

2.

Id.

3.

See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1240) (prohibiting credit card issuers from
including mandatory arbitration clauses as a tactic to prevent class-action
lawsuits). The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection conducted a study
in which it found that “[w]hen asked if they could participate in class-action
lawsuits against their credit card issuer, more than half of the respondents
whose contracts had pre-dispute arbitration agreements thought they could
participate (56.7 percent).” Id. at 32843. The same study analyzed
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winning would require expensive expert analysis, which Pendergast
could not risk in arbitration, absent joining a class. 4 Consequently,
Pendergast declined to pursue any action to recover the $20, and Sprint
was not held to account for its inconsistent roaming charges in the
Miami market. 5
Consumer advocates have long argued that the ability to bring class
actions in arbitration is essential to guarding against such corporate
malfeasance. 6 Thus, some have noted, with undisguised horror, that
with the DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia 7 decision, the Supreme Court has
seemingly put the final nail in the class-arbitration coffin, first
constructed with the Court’s Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp.8 holding in 2010. 9 A close examination of the
DIRECTV opinion, however, suggests that the Court was more concerned with the California court’s blatant disregard of the AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion10 holding than in broadening an anti-class
arbitration policy. 11 Indeed, in looking closely at the Concepcion line of
arbitration contracts throughout the financial services market and found
that “85 percent to 100 percent of the contracts with arbitration
agreements—covering over 99 percent of market share subject to arbitration
in the six product markets studied—included such no-class-arbitration
provisions.” Id. at 32842.
4.

Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1.

5.

Id.

6.

See Ellen Meriwether, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rule 23 Amendments:
Are Class Actions on the Precipice?, 30 Antitrust 23, 24 (2016) (noting
that “the choice is not between a class case and an individual action but
between a class action and no action at all”).

7.

136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).

8.

559 U.S. 662 (2010).

9.

Id. at 687 (holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not
agreed is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act); see Imre S. Szalai,
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: How the Supreme Court Used a Jedi Mind
Trick to Turn Arbitration Law Upside Down, 32 Ohio St. J. On Disp.
Resol. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (arguing that the “Court in
DIRECTV reached a new low, a result so extreme and ‘dangerous,’ . . . [that
the] decision turns arbitration law completely upside down”); see also SilverGreenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (quoting the Honorable William G.
Young as saying that “business has a good chance of opting out of the legal
system altogether and misbehaving without reproach”).

10.

563 U.S. 333 (2011).

11.

See Greg Klass, First Do No Harm: The DIRECTV v. Imburgia Decision,
New Priv. L. Blog (Dec. 15, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/
2015/12/15/first-do-no-harm-the-directv-v-imburgia-decision-greg-klass/
[https://perma.cc/A3YR-V4GM] (arguing that, even though the Court came
to the wrong decision, Justice Breyer’s opinion did not adopt DIRECTV’s
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cases, the DIRECTV holding is far more narrow than most commentary
would suggest.
Furthermore, the Consumer Financial Protection Board (“CFPB”),
acting under the Congressional mandate provided by section 1028(b) of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
proposed a set of rules that would prohibit financial service providers
from putting class action waivers in certain consumer agreements.12
Some corporate lawyers are reacting with horror at the promulgation
of these rules, and multiple legal challenges are likely. 13 Although it is
uncertain what a new Court might rule after the 2016 election and
subsequent appointment of a 9th justice, the current iteration of the
Court is more closely aligned in favor of allowing class-arbitrations than
the lopsided DIRECTV majority would otherwise suggest. That
balance is unlikely to shift, even if the Senate confirms a candidate in
the mold of the late Justice Scalia, as seems likely at the time of
publication. 14 This Comment, therefore, posits that the Court could
uphold the new CFPB rules against class action waivers, despite the 6–
3 DIRECTV decision. 15
argument for a presumption in favor of arbitration and did not create new
law).
12.

See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111–203, § 1028(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2004 (2010) (codified in 12 U.S.C.
5518) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds
that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”).

13.

See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule on Arbitration Would
Restore Right to Sue Banks, N.Y. Times (May 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/business/dealbook/consumer-agencymoves-to-assert-bank-customers-right-to-sue.html [https://perma.cc/E69U5TPQ] (quoting Alan S. Kaplinsky as saying that “[i]t’s going to spell the
end of arbitration”); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class:
Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 623, 629 (2012) (characterizing legal challenges to CFPB
regulations as “inevitable”).

14.

The Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch is President Trump’s nominee, and is
likely to be confirmed. In a recent tribute to the late Justice Scalia,
Gorsuch spoke at length of Scalia’s influence on his own approach to the
judiciary. See Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and
Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
905, 906 (2016).

15.

“Pro-arbitration” is in quotation marks because, despite the Court’s avowed
favor towards arbitration, this Comment will discuss the overwhelming
scholarly opinion which persuasively argues that the Court’s recent rulings
fail to display a clear understanding of arbitration in practice.
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In making that determination, Part I of this Comment will briefly
examine the history of arbitration agreements and class-action waivers
in consumer adhesion contracts. Part II will discuss how the StolzNielson line of cases, culminating in DIRECTV, have led to an apparent
inability of consumers to circumvent class action waivers. Finally, Part
III will briefly consider the likely future of such waivers in adhesion
contracts, in light of the CFPB rules limiting class action waivers and
arbitration clauses in certain financial services contracts.

I. Arbitration and Class Actions
A.

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and Consumer Contracts

In 1925, Congress enacted the precursor to what is now known as
the FAA, in order to enforce commercial arbitral agreements in front
of a hostile judiciary. 16 As codified into law, the enforcement scope of
the FAA is limited to “[a] written provision in any maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction.” 17 This § 2 enforcement clause is the “heart of the FAA”
which served to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration. 18 It did so by
putting arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contract law, as
Congress intended when it enacted the statute. 19 In the 1980s, however,
the Court shifted from an “equal footing” to a “pro-arbitration” stance,
when it stated that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration.” 20 This judicial shift towards “pro-arbitration”—in opposition to Congress’ explicit intention
to create “equal footing” 21—marked the beginning of a series of cases
16.

The FAA was called the U.S. Arbitration Act when President Calvin
Coolidge signed it into law in 1925. It was renamed the Federal Arbitration
Act in 1947, when it was reenacted. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L. J. 2804, 2861–62 (2015) (explaining the
origin and constitutionality of the FAA).

17.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

18.

Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 91, 92 (2012).

19.

Id. at 93 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); S. Rep. No. 68536, at 2–3 (1924)).

20.

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (adopting both a proarbitration stance, as well as broadening the application of the FAA to
preempt state law).

21.

See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (requiring enforcement of arbitration clauses); H.R.
Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (“An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”).
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where the Court misapplied the FAA when addressing the issue of class
arbitration. 22
Congress certainly intended the FAA to facilitate arbitration between merchants and other parties with equal bargaining power, but
did not express such an intention for the FAA to be applicable to adhesion contracts. 23 In fact, the legislative record indicates that Congress
was concerned with that very possibility. In a lengthy exchange, members of Congress discussed the danger that employers and corporations
could use the FAA to impose mandatory arbitration in contracts where
the other party did not have equal bargaining power, and explicitly
stated that the FAA would not allow that to occur. 24 Since Congress’

22.

See Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class
Arbitration: A Tragedy of Errors, 2012 J. Disp. Resol. 21, 21 (2012) (“[T]he
U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of confusing and, at times, confused
opinions on class arbitration.”).

23.

See id. at 26 (noting the differences between traditional arbitration disputes
and those involving adhesion contracts); see, e.g., Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds
a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s.”).

24.

An exchange between a member of a sub-committee of the Senate
Commission on the Judiciary and witness, over what eventually became the
FAA, makes this concern over adhesion contracts clear:
Mr. W. H. H. PIATT: . . . It is not intended that this shall be an act
referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants
the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as
to what their damages are, if they want to do it.
Senator WALSH of Montana: The trouble about the matter is that a
great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not
voluntary things at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in it.
You can take that or you can leave it . . . . Either you can make that
contract or you can not make any contract. It is the same with a good
many contracts of employment. A man says “These are our terms. All
right, take it or leave it.” Well, there is nothing for the man to do except
to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried by the
court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no
confidence at all.
Mr. PIATT: That would be the case in that kind of a case, I think; but
it is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases.
Mr. PIATT: . . . I would say I would not favor any kind of legislation that
would permit the forcing of a man to sign that kind of contract . . . .
Senator WALSH of Montana: You can see where they are not really
voluntary contracts, in a strict sense.
Mr. PIATT: I think that ought to be protested against, because it is the
primary end of this contract that it is a contract between merchants one
with another, buying and selling goods . . . .
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enactment of the FAA, however, the judiciary has held that “both
employment and consumer contracts constitute ‘commerce’ within the
meaning of the FAA.” 25 Nonetheless, until the 1980s, the Court did not
consider arbitration agreements “operative when parties had significantly different bargaining powers.” 26 For example, in Wilko v. Swan,27
the Court unanimously recognized that “the right to select the ‘forum’
even after the creation of a liability is a ‘substantial right’ and that the
agreement, restricting that choice, would thwart the express purpose of
the [federal] statute.” 28 Thus, the Court recognized Congress’s concern
over the significant risk to consumers incurred by imposing mandatory
arbitration in adhesion contracts.
In a series of holdings throughout the 1980s, however, the Court
gradually abandoned the Wilko Court’s concerns over unequal bargaining power between parties to an arbitration agreement and parties’
statutory right to legal recourse. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 29 the Court allowed for the arbitrability of
antitrust claims under the Sherman Act. There, the Court held that
there is no “presumption against arbitration of statutory claims . . .
[nor] any reason to depart from the federal policy favoring arbitration
where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded
on statutory rights.” 30 In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 31 the Court upheld the arbitrability of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Securities
Exchange Act claims by finding that the FAA requires the courts to
rigorously enforce arbitration agreements and that “the burden is on
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm.
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9–10 (1923) (statement of W. H.
H. Piatt).
25.

Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration 309 (2nd ed.
2014).

26.

Resnik, supra note 16, at 2862 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435
(1953) (“While a buyer and seller . . . under some circumstances[] may deal
at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted
with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.”)). See also
Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 265 (1949) (finding that
“contracts limiting the choice of venue are void as conflicting with the
[Federal Employers’] Liability Act”).

27.

346 U.S. 427 (1953).

28.

Id. at 438.

29.

473 U.S. 614 (1985).

30.

Id. at 615.

31.

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” 32
Finally, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 33
the Court ruled that claims under the Securities Act were arbitrable,
even absent express consent. 34 Thus, the Court gradually moved away
from the notion of express consent, despite it being a central tenet of
the practice of arbitration. 35
B.

The Emergence of Class Actions in Arbitration

As the Court began enforcing mandatory arbitration in adhesion
contracts, arbitration clauses became well-nigh ubiquitous. 36
Corporations now use them in a variety of contexts, ranging from consumer purchases, financial services to nursing home contracts. These
form contracts are “provided to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it32.

Id. at 226–27.

33.

490 U.S. 477 (1989).

34.

Id. at 480–81 (overruling Wilko and its “steadily eroded” view toward
arbitration). See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (holding
that the FAA supersedes state law). Southland also marked the beginning of
unrestrained criticism of the Court’s rulings on arbitration, with Justice
O’Connor’s blistering dissent: “Today’s decision is unfaithful to congressional
intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA’s antecedents and the
intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable.” Id. at 36 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting).

35.

Scholar Gary Born has noted that, regardless of what the parties choose to
call their forum, it is “necessary to examine the substance of a dispute
resolution provision to determine, objectively, whether it constitutes an
agreement to arbitrate under applicable law.” Gary B. Born,
International Arbitration: Law and Practice § 1.01A (2012). Born
then goes on to state that “[w]ith some variations, virtually all authorities
accept that arbitration is—and only is—a process by which parties
consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker,
selected by or for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute
in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording each party an
opportunity to present its case.” Id. (emphasis added).

36.

These clauses are generally considered mandatory because “they do not
allow the consumer a means by which to opt out of the clause, and they
become effective upon use or purchase.” Kristina A. Del Vecchio, Consumer
Class Claims and Arbitration: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, Banking
& Fin. Servs. Pol’y Rep., Oct. 2014, at 1. In addition, the CFPB found
that, other than payday and private student loan agreements, most financial
consumer contracts did not contain an “opt-out” provision, and the ones
that did generally require all authorized users to sign and mail a document
to the company, within a specific time. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed.
Reg. 32830, 32842 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1240). Even if the company included an opt-out provision, most consumers
are unaware of that option. Id. at 32843.
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basis,” which terms become operable at the point of purchase. 37 Within
twenty years of the Court overturning Wilko, arbitration clauses had
even become common in employment contracts. A 2007 survey found
that 46.8% of 757 responding companies used employment arbitration,
up from only 4 out of 107 in 1991. 38 This explosion of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts between parties with unequal bargaining
power thus fulfilled the very misgivings expressed by members of Congress in the legislative record of 1924. 39
Section 2 of the FAA clearly requires party consent in order for an
arbitration agreement to be binding, and the Court has continually
underlined consent as an integral aspect of enforcing arbitration.40
Courts, however, generally look only to the terms of the agreement in
determining whether such consent is present. 41 Even though many consumers may be completely unaware that they have relinquished their
rights to jury trials when accepting an adhesion contract, it is highly
unlikely that a court would refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement
on grounds of unconscionability. 42 In fact, the Supreme Court has not
found, in any case, that “arbitration [is] inadequate, inaccessible, or
ineffective to vindicate rights.” 43
37.

Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Houston L. Rev. 1237, 1247 (2001).

38.

Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and
Civil Litigation, 35 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 91, 95–96 (2014).

39.

Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32835–36.

40.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (“[T]he first task of a court asked
to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute.”).

41.

See Vernon v. Qwest Comm’ns Int’l, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo.
2013) (enforcing an arbitration clause and class action waiver contained in
a provider’s terms and conditions, even though the customers never signed
the agreement, nor were provided paper copies of such); Alderman, supra
note 37, at 1249 n.47 (citing numerous examples of the court finding
consumer consent to adhesion contracts).

42.

In its study, the CFPB found that “[w]hen asked if they could participate in
class action lawsuits against their credit card issuer, more than half of the
respondents whose contracts had pre-dispute arbitration agreements thought
they could participate (56.7 percent).” Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg.
32843.

43.

Resnik, supra note 16, at 2886; see, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80 (2000) (syllabus) (holding that an “agreement to
arbitrate is not rendered unenforceable simply because it says nothing about
arbitration costs, and thus fails to provide her protection from potentially
substantial costs of pursuing her federal statutory claims in the arbitral
forum”). The Court also “rejected generalized attacks on arbitration that rest
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Despite the Court’s advocacy, it is not clear whether informed
parties necessarily prefer forgoing their rights to litigation in favor of
the efficiency of arbitration. A recent comparative study of consumer
and nonconsumer contracts used by large public corporations showed
that while over seventy-five percent of the consumer contracts included
arbitration clauses, only six percent of the corporations’ nonemployment, nonconsumer contracts included mandatory arbitration. 44 This
data led the authors of the study to surmise, rather plausibly, that “the
frequent use of arbitration clauses in the same firms’ consumer
contracts may be an effort to preclude aggregate consumer action rather
than, as often claimed, an effort to promote fair and efficient dispute
resolution.” 45 The disparity between the use of arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts, and the lack of such in negotiated contracts between parties with equal bargaining power also suggests that corporations may not prefer efficiency against the risk of forgoing the right to
litigation for themselves. 46
In its shift away from the unanimous Wilko Court’s concerns over
consent, the Court has focused on the avowed “simplicity, informality
. . . of arbitration” and its “streamlined proceedings and expeditious
results . . . [which] cause[s] parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes.”47
In agreeing to arbitration, a party waives “a wide range of procedural
rights and protections that it would otherwise be entitled to claim in a

on ‘suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded
in the substantive law.’” Id. at 89–90 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
44.

Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer
and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 871, 882–83 (2008).

45.

Id. at 871.

46.

See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration:
An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of
Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 335 (2007) (noting that
“[l]ittle evidence was found to support the proposition that [public companies
that filed contracts with the SEC] routinely regard arbitration clauses as
efficient or otherwise desirable contract terms”). However, in discussing this
study, scholars Drahozal and Ware caution against reading too large an
inference from its results “[be]cause the litigation process receives government
subsidies, sophisticated parties can be expected to agree to arbitrate only
when arbitration has a large cost (or other) advantage over litigation.”
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 433, 435
(2010).

47.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628, 633 (1985).
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judicial proceeding.” 48 Proponents argue that this efficacy leads to lower
costs for consumers, since the cost of individual disputes is limited by
fewer procedural and evidentiary rules, and “is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the parties.” 49
Arbitration can certainly be less costly in addressing complex or
large disputes, as the parties agree to eschew extensive discovery and
evidentiary rules, as well as appellate review, while also relying on robust enforcement mechanisms. 50 Enforcing arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, however, can significantly raise the cost of proceedings
for consumers. These clauses often preclude access, absent the consent
of the corporation, to the small claims court that would otherwise be
best suited for the small sums typically under dispute. 51 In addition,
many arbitration clauses allow for cost-shifting, so a consumer may
48.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District at 22, Discover Bank v. John Szetela, 537 U.S. 1226
(2003) (denying cert.) (No. 02-829), 2002 WL 32133742, at *22.

49.

Michael Hoenig & Linda M. Brown, Arbitration and Class Action Waivers
Under Concepcion: Reason and Reasonableness Deflect Strident Attacks,
68 Ark. L. Rev. 669, 679 (2015) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-542, at 3
(1982)). At the same time, the Court has also held that efficiency is not
necessarily the goal of enforcing arbitration agreements. In Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, the Court held that “[w]hen arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction” courts must enforce
motions to compel arbitration, “even where the result would be the possibly
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.” 470
U.S. 213, 216–17 (1985).

50.

It should also be noted that this Comment is concerned with binding
arbitration clauses in domestic contracts, as distinct from such clauses in
international commercial contracts. In international contracts, sophisticated
parties do generally prefer binding arbitration, as such clauses prevent forum
shopping and provide much greater certainty of enforcement than a foreign
jurisdiction would. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 46, at 341 (showing
that sophisticated parties prefer not to arbitrate domestic issues).

51.

Alderman, supra note 37, at 1250 (comparing the typical price of $100 in
total to access small claims court, versus a possible $1000 daily cost of using
an arbitrator). The CFPB study analyzed the difference in procedural costs
and “noted that the fee for filing a case in Federal court is $350 plus a $50
administrative fee—paid by the party filing suit, regardless of the amount
being sought—and the fee for a small claims filing in Philadelphia Municipal
Court ranges from $63 to $112.38. In arbitration, under the AAA consumer
fee schedule that took effect March 1, 2013, the consumer pays a $200
administrative fee, regardless of the amount of the claim and regardless of
the party that filed the claim; in JAMS arbitrations, when a consumer
initiates arbitration against the company, the consumer is required to pay a
$250 fee.” Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32844. However, the CFPB
found in its study that “most of the arbitration agreements contained a . . .
‘carve-out,’ permitting either the consumer or both parties to file suit in
small claims court.” Id. at 32842.
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potentially bear the risk of the full cost of an unsuccessful dispute in
arbitration. 52 As the “mass production of arbitration clauses” has
become an integral aspect of consumer transactions, consumer advocates point to these costs and risks of mandatory arbitration as a
significantly troubling aspect of form contracts. 53 It is certainly true
that class actions do not easily adapt to the “fast and efficient” nature
of commercial arbitration, but as noted earlier, requiring a party to
submit to arbitration, absent clear and unambiguous consent, is also
not consistent with the practice of arbitration. Nor is it consistent with
Congress’ clear intent in passing the FAA. 54 Because the Supreme Court
has essentially elided over the latter issue, both plaintiff and defendant
lawyers continue to extensively litigate the former. 55
One way plaintiff lawyers fought back against mandatory arbitration was by initiating class arbitration disputes. 56 Consumer advocates argued that it was an effective way to mitigate the expense of
arbitration, as well as the risk of cost shifting. At the same time, such
action could hold corporations accountable, even when the damage to
each consumer might have been minimal, as when Sprint allegedly
wrongly charged roaming fees in the Miami market. 57 While aggregation
is not specifically forbidden, the FAA is silent on the issue. In practice,
parties adopt class action procedures available in litigation, with the
significant difference that in arbitration, class membership is limited to
“those governed by similar arbitration agreements.” 58
52.

“The Study found that many arbitration agreements permit the arbitrator
to reallocate arbitration fees from one party to the other. About one-third
of credit card arbitration agreements, one-fourth of checking account
arbitration agreements, and half of payday loan arbitration agreements
expressly permitted the arbitrator to shift arbitration costs to the
consumer.” Id. at 32842.

53.

See generally Resnik, supra note 16 (discussing the diffusion of consumer
rights as the Supreme Court gradually moved to enforce arbitration and
class waiver clauses in consumer and employee contracts).

54.

See supra note 24.

55.

See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 34 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stolt-Nielsen, which found that class arbitration agreements
require clear indication that parties agreed to class arbitration).

56.

Id. at 21–22 (recounting the development of class arbitration).

57.

See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (explaining the impediment
of arbitration clauses in a consumer lawsuit against Sprint). “The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (2004)).

58.

Francisco Blavi & Gonzalo Vial, Class Actions in International Commercial
Arbitration, 39 Fordham Int’l L.J. 791, 794 (2016).
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In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 59 the Court first considered the
question of “whether arbitration under the federal Act is impaired when
a class-action structure is imposed on the process by the state courts.”60
Although the Court noted it was an issue of first impression, it held
that the question of class arbitration had not been contested on federal
grounds, and was for California to decide in this instance. 61 Class
arbitration continued as a niche practice, however, largely confined to
California courts, until the Supreme Court decided Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle 62 in 2003. 63 In that case, arising out of South
Carolina, the Court determined that if the arbitration agreement did
not “clearly preclude class action” the appointed arbitrator would
determine whether to certify the class as the FAA “did not foreclose
class action.” 64 Corporations sought to push back against the postGreen Tree explosion of class arbitrations by inserting explicit class
action waivers in all mandatory arbitration clauses. 65 In response,
California courts began to invalidate such waivers on public policy
grounds. 66 In 2005, the California Supreme Court stepped into the fray
and held that state courts could find a class action waiver to be
unconscionable “when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.” 67 This
so-called Discover Bank rule for unconscionability was affirmed by the
9th Circuit, and lower courts began to find class action waivers to be
invalid under this unconscionability test. 68
59.

465 U.S. 1 (1983).

60.

Id. at 3.

61.

See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining how the Supreme
Court reached its decision in Southland).

62.

539 U.S. 444 (2003).

63.

See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility:
Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 813, 835 (2008) (discussing
the rise of class arbitration following the Supreme Court’s decision in Green
Tree).

64.

Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444 (syllabus).

65.

See Drahozal, supra note 63, at 838 (illustrating the amount of class action
waivers in arbitration clauses).

66.

The California Court of Appeal refused to enforce a credit card class action
waiver on the grounds that “it violates public policy by granting Discover a
‘get out of jail free’ card while compromising important consumer rights.”
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (2002).

67.

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).

68.

See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that
“[w]here an arbitration agreement is concerned, the agreement is
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While consumer plaintiffs lawyers saw the unconscionability test as
a winning argument, corporate entities were determined to abrogate
California courts’ public policy reasoning against class-action waivers.69
In his petition to the Supreme Court on behalf of Discover Bank, future
Chief Justice Roberts argued that Szetela v. Discover was in direct
conflict with the “Court’s cases emphasizing the Act’s ‘central purpose’
of enforcing arbitration agreements ‘according to their terms.’”70
Furthermore, he argued that “state laws in conflict with the Act’s
strong policy in favor of arbitration must give way . . . [as] the Court
of Appeal’s couching its ruling on ‘unconscionability’ grounds [does not]
blunt the Arbitration Act’s preemptive force.” 71 The Court declined to
accept the Discover petition, however, and the subsequent Discover
Bank unconscionability rule remained unchallenged for a few years.
After Roberts ascended to the Court as Chief Justice in 2005,
however, advocates renewed their push to strengthen corporations’
ability to impose class-action waivers. 72 It is against this backdrop that
the Roberts Court has issued a series of rulings, starting with StolzNielson in 2010 and culminating with DIRECTV in 2015, that have
severely curtailed consumers’ ability to bring class-actions under
mandatory arbitration clauses.

II. The Disappearance of Class-Arbitration
In 2010, the Court accepted Stoltz-Nielson. As in Bazzle, the corporation was challenging an arbitral class-action award where the
arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class aggregation. This time
however, the outcome was decidedly different. Justice Alito, writing for
the majority, determined that the issue was “ripe for judicial review”
unconscionable unless the arbitration remedy contains a ‘modicum of
bilaterality’”) (citation omitted); Josephine Lee, California Consumer
Contracts After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 15 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J.
219, 221 (2014) (acknowledging that after Discover Bank, lower courts began
applying an unconscionability test and finding class arbitration waivers
invalid). But see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of 2002:
California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (but Undermine Federal
Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58 Bus. Law. 1289, 1290–91 (2003)
(noting that state courts often find “no-class action clauses” to be not
unconscionable in federal arbitration law).
69.

See Szetela, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1096 (holding that a credit card class action
waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable).

70.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 21.

71.

Id. at 5, 12.

72.

Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 1 (investigating a “coalition of
credit card companies and retailers” that moved to “block class actions”).
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and held that “[i]mposing class arbitration on parties who have not
agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).” 73 In holding that class actions could only be
allowed when explicitly permitted by the arbitration clause, the Court
“substantially undercut both the Court’s earlier decision in Bazzle and
the burgeoning growth of class arbitrations.” 74 In her dissent, Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens, dryly noted that the
issue was in fact not ripe for judicial review, and that the Court was
substituting its judgment for that of experienced arbitrators. 75
Stoltz-Nielson limited consumers’ ability to bring class actions when
the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, but courts still had
discretion to apply the Discover Bank unconscionability rule. In 2011,
a coalition of credit card companies and retailers presented a case that
was carefully selected to knock out courts’ ability to refuse to enforce
class-action waivers under public policy objections. 76 In accepting
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court had the opportunity to
address the public policy exceptions Chief Justice Roberts had argued
against on behalf of Discover Bank in 2002. Justice Scalia wrote the
plurality opinion (Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion)
in which the Court upended the Discover Bank rule “as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.” 77 In holding that the
73.

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 663 (2010).

74.

Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 22.

75.

Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 688 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Justice
Sotomayor took no part in the proceedings). An ongoing critique of the
Court’s ruling is that the Court failed to understand the sophisticated nature
of arbitration. See Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 39–42 (discussing the
Court’s failure to consider various nuances of arbitration proceedings).

76.

In its investigation, the New York Times found that AT&T followed a
specific strategy in its arbitration clause in order to “try to tempt the
Supreme Court to wade into the fray.” Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra
note 1. This strategy was to include (unusually) consumer-friendly provisions
in its arbitration clause, such as denying AT&T reimbursement of its
attorney’s fees, and requiring AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum and
claimant’s attorney fees, if the customer received an arbitration award
greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer. AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 338 (2011). See Hoenig & Brown, supra note 49,
at 671 (providing an overview of Discover Bank v. Superior Court);
Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32842 (noting that “a significant share
of arbitration agreements across almost all markets did not address
attorney’s fees”).

77.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. Justice Thomas concurred with the ruling, but
on the grounds that § 2 of the FAA requires “enforcement of an agreement
to arbitrate unless a party successfully asserts a defense concerning the
formation of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual
mistake.” Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia reasoned that
Congress never intended the FAA to encompass class arbitration, since
class arbitration “requires procedural formality” that Congress likely
did not want an arbitrator to define. 78 Although Born and Salas note
that the result of Concepcion was likely correct, they expressed concern
that with Scalia’s “misconceived and dangerous” reasoning that the
FAA only encompasses arbitration as it was practiced in 1924, the
Court “abandoned the conception of ‘arbitration’ . . . as a process for
resolving a wide variety of disputes, using an equally wide range of
procedures, depending on the parties’ individual needs and
objectives.” 79
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion, in which he was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, took issue with
Scalia’s narrow reading of the purpose of the FAA. Justice Breyer
contended that the Discover Bank rule fell directly within the Act’s §
2 savings clause, and was therefore “consistent with the basic ‘purpose
behind’ the act . . . [which is to] ‘ensur[e] judicial enforcement’ of
arbitration agreements” that are valid and enforceable. 80 Justice Breyer
noted that the FAA permits courts to refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements on grounds that exist “for the revocation of any contract.” 81
He thereby disagreed with the majority that allowing state courts to
enforce contract law against arbitration did not, per se, impinge on the
purpose of the FAA, and further, that Congress did not intend to
guarantee certain particular procedural advantages, as Scalia argued.
Instead, the Court’s focus should have been on the Act’s stated
objective, which “was to secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to
arbitrate,” regardless of the agreed-upon procedure. 82 As such, Justice
Breyer argued that class actions were “consistent with the use of
arbitration,” 83 as the decisive factor was that “California law sets forth
certain circumstances in which ‘class action waivers’ in any contract are
unenforceable.” 84 Therefore, the California law met the FAA’s
requirement that arbitration be treated equally as other contract law.
With the narrow majority Concepcion ruling, however, the Court
78.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349.

79.

Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 22; see Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350
(discussing weaknesses of arbitration as a dispute resolution process).

80.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).

81.

Id. at 357 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) (emphasis added).

82.

Id. at 360.

83.

Id. at 362.

84.

Id. at 357.
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delivered a decisive blow against allowing class actions into arbitration. 85
Given Justice Breyer’s careful discussion of the purpose of the FAA
and its savings clause in his Concepcion dissent, commentators noted
with surprise that he wrote the majority opinion in DIRECTV, which
served to uphold Concepcion. 86 Most of that commentary suggests that
Breyer’s opinion indicates that any attempt to protect class arbitration
is now doomed before the Supreme Court. 87 A closer analysis, however,
suggests that Breyer was more concerned about the California Court of
Appeal’s clear attempt to circumvent the recent Concepcion holding,
than in further stricturing class-arbitration. Furthermore, Breyer’s
opinion is consistent with his Concepcion dissent in that he argued in
both cases that California courts must treat an arbitration clause the
same way as they would treat any other contract.
DIRECTV v. Imburgia arose from a dispute over the company’s
service agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration clause with
a class action waiver. 88 The waiver included language “that if the ‘law
of your state’ makes the waiver . . . unenforceable, then the entire
85.

In addition to forestalling class actions on contractual and unconscionability
grounds with Stoltz-Nielson and Concepcion, a plurality of the Court ruled
in 2013 that courts cannot invalidate a contractual class waiver when the
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim might
preclude a vindication of federal statutory rights. Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309–12 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring;
Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting; Sotomayor, J., recused herself
as she served on the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Panel that ruled in favor
of the plaintiffs).

86.

See Ellen Meriwether, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Rule 23 Amendments:
Are Class Actions on the Precipice?, 30 Antitrust Magazine 23 (2016)
(noting that without Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court may reach a different
conclusion concerning the appropriateness of class action bans in arbitration
agreements); Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A
Prognosis, 65 Emory L.J. 1569, 1593 (2016) (criticizing Supreme Court
Justices for not joining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in DIRECTV); Ronald
Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Rebuke California Courts (Again) for
Refusal to Enforce Arbitration Agreement, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 14, 2015,
2:08
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/
2015/12/opinion-analysis-justices-rebuke-california-courts-again-for-refusalto-enforce-arbitration-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/M32B-CNVK] (suggesting that the lower court’s attempt to avoid Concepcion in DIRECTV
may have swayed Breyer to change his position).

87.

See Meriwether, supra note 86 (explaining that the Roberts Court
continuously rejected arguments “that class action bans in arbitration
agreements violated state public policy”); Szalai, supra note 9, at 2
(arguing “that the Court’s DIRECTV decision turns arbitration law
completely upside down”).

88.

DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 462, 464 (2015).

626

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 2·2016
The Future of Class-Action Waivers in Consumer Contract Arbitration
Agreements after DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia

arbitration provision ‘is unenforceable.’” 89 When, in 2008, customers
brought a class action in California state court against DIRECTV over
early termination fees, DIRECTV sought to have the arbitration clause
enforced, 90 but Discover Bank controlled, which rendered DIRECTV’s
arbitration agreement unenforceable under California law. 91 By 2011,
however, the Concepcion ruling had overturned the Discover Bank rule.
Nonetheless, in 2012, the Court of Appeals held that “the law of
California would find the . . . waiver unenforceable.” 92 The California
court reasoned that the clause the parties agreed to referred to “the law
of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the
FAA.” 93 In doing so, the court applied sections of California’s
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), instead of the Discover
Bank rule, to render the class waiver unenforceable. 94 The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the relevant sections of the CLRA
embodied the Discover Bank rule, and thus would be preempted under
federal law. 95 The court, however, “reasoned that just as the parties
were free in their contracts to refer to the laws of different States or
different nations, so too were they free to refer to California law as it
would have been without this Court’s holding invalidating the Discover
Bank rule.” 96 Finally, the California court found that “the law of your
state” was a specific provision that governed the general arbitration
provision, and that the phrase was ambiguous and should therefore be
constructed against the drafter. 97
The California court’s attempt to narrow the Concepcion holding
by allowing parties a valid choice of invalid law is what Justice Breyer
seemed most concerned about in writing for the majority. The Justice
began his commentary by noting that California courts are bound by
Concepcion, and stating that “[l]ower court judges are certainly free to
note their disagreement with a decision of this Court. But the
‘Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from
federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to

89.

Id. at 466 (citation omitted).

90.

Id.

91.

Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2012 WL 7657788 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Feb. 26, 2012).

92.

DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467.

93.

Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th 338, 344 (2014).

94.

Id. at 342.

95.

Id. at 344.

96.

DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467 (emphasis added).

97.

Id.
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recognize the superior authority of its source.’” 98 In particular, Justice
Breyer noted that “the view that state law retains independent force
even after it has been authoritatively invalidated by this Court is one
courts are unlikely . . . to apply in other contexts.” 99 At the same time,
the Court acknowledged that “California courts are the ultimate
authority on [California contract] law” but only if their decisions “rest[]
upon ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.’” 100 The California court’s distinction, where parties can
choose to be bound by invalid law, did not put “arbitration contracts
‘on equal footing with all other contracts’” and therefore did not “give
‘due regard . . . to the federal policy favoring arbitration.’” 101 Because
the California courts reached a conclusion on contract interpretation
that would only be applicable to arbitration, the Court found the Court
of Appeal’s interpretation discriminatory toward arbitration, and thus
preempted by the FAA. 102 This is entirely consistent with Breyer’s
Concepcion dissent, where he argued that class arbitration should be
allowed when treated the same as any other contract. 103
After presenting the Court’s opinion that the “California courts
would not interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the same
way,” Justice Breyer helpfully labeled the reasons 1–6 as to why the
Court reached that holding. 104 Three of the reasons focused on federal
supremacy, as outlined above. The other three focused on the fact that
the clause was not ambiguous, and that California courts would not
have reached the same interpretation in cases not involving arbitration.
Therefore, the Court held that California’s application of the
“antidrafter canon” was not appropriate in this case. 105
It is interesting to note that in the oral arguments, Chief Justice
Roberts also did not seem troubled by the California court’s contention
that the contract was ambiguous. Instead, he obliquely referred back to
the argument he raised on behalf of Discover Bank, that courts are
generally obliged to enforce a strong pro-arbitration policy. 106 The Chief

98.

Id. at 468 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 357 (1990)).

99.

Id. at 470.

100. Id. at 468 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
101. Id. at 471 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011).
104. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469–71.
105. Id. at 465.
106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 5.
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Justice expressed a concern that the California court’s ruling instead
displayed an “unexpressed” hostility towards arbitration. 107
That focus on the California court’s hostility to arbitration is reflected in the written opinion, where Justice Breyer seemed content to
merely reaffirm the Court’s “pro-arbitration” policy, as well as remind
California courts of the Supremacy clause. 108 Indeed, as one commentator noted, Breyer’s focus on “the law of your state” as unambiguous kept the Court from creating even more problematic arbitration
law. 109 If the Court had accepted that the clause was ambiguous, or
accepted DIRECTV’s argument that that the FAA “requires a presumption in favor of arbitration,” that would have served to upend the
contra proferentem rule in favor of the corporations who routinely draft
these clauses. 110 Justice Breyer chose instead to dismiss the California
court’s contention that the contract should be construed against the
drafter, by stating that the term “the laws of your state” unambiguously refers to valid state law, and that California courts would not
interpret that phrase to include invalid laws in “cases not involving
arbitration.” 111 Indeed, the Justice underscored the narrowness of the
decision by declaring that the Court’s holding went “no further than
present well-established law.” 112
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg took issue with the Court’s assertion that this decision created no new law. Instead, she posited that the
ruling was “a dangerous first” that interpreted the arbitration clause in
favor of the drafter, in other words, upending the contra proferentem
rule. 113 As discussed above however, it seems clear that the holding was
narrowly constructed to avoid doing just that. Nonetheless, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the clause was unambiguously constructed in
favor of the consumers, and was interpreted in favor of the drafters.
107. See Mann, supra note 86 (summarizing Justice Breyer’s suggestion to lower
courts to follow Supreme Court rulings and the Supremacy Clause). Chief
Justice Roberts demonstrated his concern by asking “what could be more
hostile to the FAA than to interpret a phrase that says nothing about the
FAA to dispense with our holdings about . . . what the FAA has to say.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct.
463 (2015) (No. 14-462).
108. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 467.
109. Klass, supra note 11.
110. Id. (explaining that the contra proferentem rule requires that an ambiguous
clause be interpreted against the drafter, and that, had the Court ruled that
the FAA requires an ambiguous clause to be interpreted in favor of
arbitration, it would have set a dangerous precedent for contract law).
111. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465.
112. Id. at 471.
113. Id. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Yet, when written and originally agreed upon, the clause meant that
the customer’s “home state laws” govern the relationship and, therefore,
the CLRA controlled contracts agreed upon in California. 114 Justice
Ginsburg sought to distinguish the applicability of the CLRA post–
Concepcion by arguing that Concepcion “held only that a State cannot
compel a party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agreement unconditionally prohibits class procedures.” 115
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reads as a well-reasoned analysis of the
Court’s many misadventures with the FAA, especially in AMEX and
Concepcion, that “deprive consumers of effective relief”—particularly
concerning when the parties may not have consented to be bound.116
While a principled stand for consumers, the dissent does not squarely
address the issue most troubling to the majority: the California
Appellate Court sought to essentially ignore the Concepcion ruling by
treating the arbitration clause differently than it would other contracts.
This Comment posits that may be the likely reason that Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent only received the vote of Justice Sotomayor. 117
As discussed above, it seems clear that the Court was more concerned about the California’s imaginative use of “law of your state” to
circumvent the Court’s Concepcion holding than in reaffirming, or
strengthening, class action waivers. Perhaps, therefore, the Justices
simply did not view DIRECTV as the appropriate case to reverse its
own rulings from just a few years earlier, rather than seizing the opportunity to turn “arbitration law completely upside down.” 118 This Comment suggests that the former is the likelier reason Justice Kagan, who
wrote the dissent in AMEX, joined Justice Breyer, the author of the
Concepcion dissent, in the DIRECTV opinion upholding Concepcion.119
Despite the hue and cry, therefore, the DIRECTV ruling may in
fact mark the end of the Court’s move to narrow consumer rights in
contracts with “powerful economic enterprises,” rather than marking

114. Id. at 473–75.
115. Id. at 473.
116. Id. at 476.
117. Justice Thomas also dissented from the majority, but did so on the grounds
that the FAA does not apply to state court proceedings—a viewpoint that
had not been seriously argued since Southland. See Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Congress intended
to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.”).
118. Szalai, supra note 9 (manuscript at 2).
119. See Klonoff, supra note 86, at 1593 (2016) (noting that a “particularly
troubling feature of DIRECTV” is that Justices Kagan and Breyer “refused
to read Concepcion narrowly” and did not join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent).
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the end of class-arbitration. 120 Indeed, one commentator suggested that
“the outcome of DIRECTV should serve as a demarcation, a sort of
tipping point, for consumer advocate groups.” 121 This Comment posits
that such a demarcation has already been created. In addition to not
creating new law, the Court also did not publicly admonish the
California Court of Appeal for its attempt to limit Concepcion, as it
rebuked and summarily reversed the 6th Circuit in a per curiam opinion
issued that same day. 122 The absence of a “pointed rebuke” may very
well signal that the Court is open to revisiting the issue of class action
waivers in the near future. 123
Of course, such a shift may also depend on who will eventually
replace the late Justice Scalia. 124 With the author of the narrow majorities in Concepcion and AMEX no longer on the bench, however, it may
be that the Robert’s Court could very well reconsider its current “proarbitration” outlook, especially given the current and expected numerous challenges to the CFPB’s proposed rules on arbitration clauses and
class waivers.

III. The Possible Reemergence of Class Arbitration
after DIRECTV
The CFPB’s Congressional mandate includes the ability to conduct
a comprehensive empirical study of the use of arbitration clauses, and
subsequently propose rules to address relevant issues. 125 The CFPB
120. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. Angelica Sanchez Vega, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia: Supreme Court Holds
California Court’s Interpretation Preempted by Federal Arbitration Act, 91
Notre Dame L. Rev. Online 70, 77 (2016).
122. White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 458 (2015) (pointedly stating that the 6th
Circuit, “despite the substantial deference it must accord to state-court
rulings in federal habeas proceedings . . . contravene[d] controlling precedents
from this Court, and it is now necessary to reverse the Court of Appeals by
this summary disposition”).
123. See Mann, supra note 86 (suggesting that the majority’s opinion in
DIRECTV was not as harsh as it seemed at first analysis, as the decision
was not unanimous and the Court did not rebuke the 9th Circuit for
“intransigence”).
124. Ellen Meriwether, supra note 86, at 27 (“[T]he future of modern Rule 23
may well depend on whether Scalia’s replacement shares similar views on
the relative importance of the class action mechanism.”); Klonoff, supra
note 86, at 1599 (“It is also possible that Concepcion, American Express,
and DIRECTV could be judicially or legislatively overruled in the next
decade as a result of changes in the composition of the Supreme Court or in
the makeup of Congress.”).
125. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 1028(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2004 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
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published its study on arbitration in 2015. 126 As discussed in Part II of
this Comment, the study found significant issues with consumers’
awareness that they were under binding arbitration, as well as few
instances of consumers bringing arbitration disputes. 127 Therefore, the
CFPB determined “that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are being
widely used to prevent consumers from seeking relief from legal
violations on a class basis.” 128
Pursuant to its findings and mandate, the CFPB proposed rules
limit the use of “pre-dispute arbitration agreements by covered providers of consumer financial products and services . . . [as] it would
prohibit providers from using a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to
block consumer class actions in court and would require providers to
insert language into their arbitration agreements reflecting this limitation.” 129 The public commenting period for these proposed rules ended
on August 22, 2016. 130 At the time of publication it is unclear whether
the rules have been affected by President Trump’s recent executive
orders. 131 Furthermore, the Wells Fargo sham accounts scandal has
thrust the issue of forced consumer arbitration back into national
headlines. 132 In response, Democratic law-makers have vowed action,
§ 5518) (“The Bureau shall conduct a study of, and shall provide a report
to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of
any future dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection
with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or services.”).
126. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to
Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a) (2015), http://files
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH6L-BAZL].
127. See id. at 11 (listing the study’s empirical findings, as related to consumer
understanding and awareness).
128. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 32829.
129. Id. at 3–4.
130. Proposed Rule: Arbitration Agreements, CFPB, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development/
arbitration-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/NX23-F9GA] (last visited Jan. 8,
2017).
131. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, Trump Administration Issues Regulatory Freeze;
Application to CFPB Uncertain, CFPB Monitor (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2017/01/23/trump-administration-issuesregulatory-freeze-application-to-cfpb-uncertain/ [https://perma.cc/95PC4QJ4].
132. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Killing Sham Accounts
by Using Arbitration, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-killing-sham-account-suitsby-using-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/S7TS-HNJ3] (describing the
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thus affecting the political expediency of rescinding these consumer
protections. 133 If unaffected, the rules on arbitration would essentially
revive the California Discover Bank rule disallowing class action waivers, but on a national basis. Even if the rules go into force however,
there is no doubt that they will be challenged.
Because the CFPB is a financial regulatory body, these rules are
limited to financial services. Nevertheless, advocates who hope to
expand prohibition against class aggregation waivers, were encouraged
by the agency’s action. 134 Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act also authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate arbitration
agreements in contracts between consumers and securities broker-dealers or investment advisors when “in the public interest and for the
protection of consumers.” 135 Thus, Congress revisited the Wilko Court’s
concerns over allowing arbitration claims under the Securities Act. In
addition, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits arbitration agreements as part
of mortgage loans, as well as in civil whistleblower retaliation actions.136
bank’s strategy to force affected customers into arbitration by arguing that
the arbitration clauses customers agreed to when opening legitimate accounts
also apply to sham accounts opened in their names).
133. See Brown and Sherman Introduce Bill to Help Wells Fargo’s Victims Get
Their Day in Court, Sherrod Brown: Senator for Ohio (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-andsherman-introduce-bill-to-help-wells-fargos-victims-get-their-day-in-court
[https://perma.cc/9256-2GVT].
134. While encouraging, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2009 marked the
end of Congressional action to reform arbitration. Multiple attempts by
Democrats in the House and Senate to pass an Arbitration Fairness Act have
failed since then. Furthermore, Donald Trump, the new Republican
President, has pledged to essentially dismantle Dodd-Frank. The Republican
House leadership is also calling for “replacing Dodd-Frank with new rules
that ease up on . . . consumer protection laws.” Billy House & Kevin Cirilli,
Trump’s Dodd-Frank Plan Will Be Early Test of Republican Unity,
Bloomberg (May 19, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
politics/articles/2016-05-19/trump-s-dodd-frank-plan-will-be-early-test-ofrepublican-unity [https://perma.cc/H5KD-KKFQ]. The House leadership
has also allowed “a Republican-backed provision to ban CFPB funding for
regulating arbitration agreements” in its appropriations bill for the upcoming
fiscal year. Yuka Hayashi, CFPB’s Arbitration Proposal Draws 13,000
Comments, Wall St. J. (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/cfpbs-arbitration-proposal-draws-13-000-comments-1471983139
[https://perma.cc/K6QF-JQYU]. Thus, the future of the CFPB itself may
rest on the outcome of the 2016 election, just as much its rules may rest on
the as-yet unappointed 9th Justice.
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(o), 80b-5(f) (2012).
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639c(e), 1514A(e)) (2012) (“No predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration
of a dispute arising under this section.”).
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In each instance, the CFPB cites a public policy justification for banning class action waivers, which Justice Breyer noted in his Concepcion
dissent was valid under the FAA savings clause. 137
As noted earlier, the future of class action waivers largely depends
on who becomes the 9th Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as what
transpires under the Trump administration. Nonetheless, Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer have all indicated that they
take the issues of consumer consent and ability to vindicate rights as
integral aspects of the FAA, and that class arbitration is an important
avenue for protecting those rights. 138 Despite the lopsided DIRECTV
decision, these four Justices could very well seek to uphold limitations
on class-action waivers in future cases. 139

Conclusion
Commentators point to DIRECTV as a definitive showing of the
Court’s unwavering “pro-arbitration” stance at the expense of both
consumers’ rights to legal recourse, as well as basic tenets of contract
law. 140 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her fiery dissent: “[T]his Court has
again expanded the scope of the FAA, further degrading the rights of
consumers and further insulating already powerful economic entities

137. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Court wrongly held “that the federal Act preempts the rule of state law” in that case).
138. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he FAA conceived of arbitration
as a ‘method of resolving disputes’—a way of using tailored and streamlined
procedures to facilitate redress of injuries . . . . In the hands of today’s
majority, arbitration threatens to become more nearly the opposite—a
mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims
and insulate wrongdoers from liability. The Court thus undermines the
FAA no less than it does the Sherman Act and other federal statutes
providing rights of action”); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Act’s purpose as “one of ‘ensur[ing] judicial
enforcement’ of arbitration agreements”); DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S.
Ct. 462, 473 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (urging the enforcement of
arbitration provisions in accordance with the terms of the contract, and
emphasizing the importance of consent, not coercion).
139. It should be noted, however, that the Court could refuse to enforce the
CFPB rules over questions of administrative power, which is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
140. See Klonoff, supra note 86, at 1593 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
DIRECTV and characterizing her argument as “very credible and
principled”); Szalai, supra note 9 (manuscript at 1–2) (commenting on the
“defective” nature of DIRECTV).
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from liability for unlawful acts.” 141 However, DIRECTV seems more a
culmination of the Court’s misunderstanding and misapplication of the
FAA against consumers in adhesion contracts, than a further stricture
on class-arbitration. 142 Given the acknowledgement of such a disastrous
history of applying the FAA by four Justices currently on the bench,
along with the CFPB’s unambiguous Congressional mandate to
regulate consumer contracts, it is just as likely that DIRECTV could
be the last case to follow the Stolz-Nielson precedent of severely
curtailing class arbitration.
The financial industry is decrying the CFPB rules as a “class action
expansion” rule that ignores the benefits of arbitration, and would all
but ensure its demise. 143 Far from spelling the “end of arbitration,”
however, if the Court were to uphold the CFPB’s rules against classaction waivers, the effect could be instead to reinforce both public and
corporate confidence in arbitration as an effective and equitable practice
of private law that squarely rests on parties’ consent. 144 Practitioners
and advocates can only hope that the Supreme Court will seek to
correct its fundamental misunderstanding of arbitration and the FAA,
as reflected in the Stoltz-Nielson line of cases. The likely challenges to
the CFPB rules may provide the Court with an early opportunity to
do just that, nearly 100 years after the FAA was ratified.
Kristina Moore †

141. DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 478 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142. Born & Salas, supra note 22, at 21 (stating that “the Court’s most recent
decisions threaten to undermine U.S. arbitration law . . . their analysis badly
misinterprets the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and misconceives the
basic concept of ‘arbitration’ in the United States”).
143. Hayashi, supra note 134.
144. See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 13 (discussing some problems
with the arbitration system that the CFPB rules may address); see also Born
& Salas, supra note 22, at 21 n.3 (discussing the impact of U.S. court
decisions on international courts and legislatures).
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